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Note
Establishing a Substantial Limitation in
Interacting with Others: A Call for Clearer
Guidance from the EEOC
Lisa M. Benrud-Larson∗
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA)1 with the laudable goal of ending discrimination
against persons with disabilities.2 Congress, however, did not
intend to protect everyone with a physical or mental impairment—only those with significant impairments. A person is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA only if he or she has a
physical or mental impairment that “substantially limits” a
“major life activit[y].”3 This definition may have seemed clear to
the ADA’s drafters, but it has proven far from clear for litigants
and the courts.4 Many argue that courts’ interpretation of “disability” under the ADA has frustrated Congress’s intent “to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”5
∗ J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; Ph.D.
(Clinical Psychology) 1997, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; B.A. 1991, Luther College. The author wishes to thank Professor Stephen Befort, Alyson
Tomme, and David Leishman for their helpful guidance. Copyright © 2006 by
Lisa M. Benrud-Larson.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
3. Id. § 12102(2).
4. See Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1147;
Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U.
L.Q. 243, 244, 251–52 (2002).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2); see also Rothstein et al., supra note 4, at 297
(noting that the underlying purpose of the ADA has been “undermined by the
failure to create a reasonably clear definition of the crucial term ‘individual
with a disability,’ which delineates the class of individuals protected by the
ADA”). See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal
Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About
It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 139–60 (2000).
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Persons with psychiatric disorders face a particularly high
hurdle when attempting to establish a disability under the
ADA.6 For example, although courts generally agree that activities affected by physical limitations (e.g., walking, seeing,
lifting) constitute “major life activities” under the ADA, they often disagree over whether activities primarily affected by mental impairments (e.g., interpersonal interaction, concentration)
also meet that definition.7
The current circuit split on how to treat the activity of “interacting with others” highlights this issue. Courts disagree on
two fundamental issues: first, whether interacting with others
should constitute a “major life activity” under the ADA; and
second, what constitutes a “substantial limitation” in interacting with others if it is recognized as a major life activity.8 The
disconnect among the courts leaves both employers and employees unsure of how to proceed when facing this difficult issue in the workplace. Employers may forego appropriate disciplinary action for fear of being accused of discrimination.
Employees may forego filing a valid discrimination claim for
fear that it will be readily dismissed by the court. Confusion
among the courts underscores the need for more concrete guidance for interpreting the ADA’s definition of disability. Such
guidance would provide needed clarity to an area of the law
currently marked by contention and confusion.
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of the
ADA’s definition of disability, focusing on three key terms:
mental impairment, major life activity, and substantial limitation. Part II outlines the current circuit split regarding first,
whether interacting with others is a “major life activity” under
6. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1168, 1175; Mark DeLoach, Note, Can’t
We All Just Get Along?: The Treatment of “Interacting with Others” as a Major
Life Activity in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1313,
1315 (2004).
7. SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 75 (2002).
8. Compare Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 202–03 (2d Cir.
2004) (determining that interacting with others constitutes a major life activity and that a plaintiff is substantially limited when an impairment significantly limits his or her fundamental ability to communicate), and McAlindin
v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234–36 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that
interacting with others is a major life activity and that a plaintiff is substantially limited when his or her interaction is characterized by severe problems
such as consistently high levels of hostility), with Soileau v. Guilford of Me.,
Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the ability to get along
with others does not constitute a major life activity).
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the ADA; and second, if so, what constitutes a “substantial
limitation” in this activity. Part III focuses on courts’ varying
interpretations of “substantial limitation” in claims brought by
persons with psychiatric disorders who allege a substantial
limitation in interacting with others. Part IV proposes recommended guidelines for determining when a plaintiff ’s psychiatric disorder substantially limits his or her ability to interact
with others, thus qualifying as a disability under the ADA. This
Note ultimately calls for the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to develop regulations establishing a presumption of disability based on recognized diagnostic criteria
and documented medical evidence.
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
Congress enacted the ADA with the stated purpose of
“provid[ing] a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”9 Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination in the workplace “against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.”10 A person is disabled for the
purposes of the ADA if he or she has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; . . . a record of such an impairment; or [is] regarded as having such an impairment.”11
Under the ADA’s definition of disability, courts must
engage in a three-step analysis to determine whether a person
with a psychiatric disorder is disabled: (1) the person must
have a mental impairment; (2) the mental impairment must
limit one or more major life activities; and (3) the limitation resulting from the mental impairment must be substantial.12 A
court determining that a plaintiff is not disabled according to
this definition dismisses the discrimination suit, foreclosing the
opportunity to decide the case on its merits. Unfortunately,
Congress failed to define any of the three key terms in an ADA
disability analysis: mental impairment, major life activity, and
substantial limitation. It did, however, authorize the EEOC to
promulgate regulations to implement Title I of the ADA.13 The

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
Id. § 12112(a).
Id. § 12102(2).
See id.
Id. § 12116; see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1–.16 (2004).
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EEOC also has issued multiple enforcement guidelines to aid in
the interpretation of the Act.14
A. MENTAL IMPAIRMENT
In its regulations, the EEOC defines “mental impairment”
as “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities.”15 It expands on this list in its
enforcement guidelines, noting that “emotional or mental illness” includes such psychiatric disorders as “major depression,
bipolar disorder, anxiety disorders . . . schizophrenia, and personality disorders.”16 The EEOC notes that the fourth edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV)17 is relevant for the purposes of identifying mental
disorders.18 EEOC guidelines also specify that “traits or behaviors” (e.g., irritability, chronic lateness) “are not, in themselves,
mental impairments, although they may be linked to mental
impairments.”19
Mental impairment is the least debated of the ADA’s three
key terms. In most cases, courts find (or defendants concede)
that diagnosed psychiatric disorders, such as bipolar disorder
and major depressive disorder, constitute a “mental impairment.”20 In contrast, “major life activity” and “substantial limi14. See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 902: DEFINITION OF THE TERM DISABILITY (2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html [hereinafter EEOC DEFINITION OF
DISABILITY]; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NOTICE NO.
915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/psych.html [hereinafter EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES].
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2).
16. EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 2–3.
17. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
18. See EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 3. The
EEOC expressly noted, however, that not every condition listed in the DSM-IV
constitutes a disability or even a mental impairment under the ADA. Id.
19. Id. at 4. For example, if an individual’s short temper, arrogance, and
impatience stem from bipolar disorder, she or he has a mental impairment
(i.e., bipolar disorder), but such personality traits in and of themselves do not
constitute impairments under the ADA. See id.
20. See, e.g., Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that a plaintiff ’s bipolar disorder is a mental impairment under the
ADA); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that a plaintiff ’s anxiety disorder constitutes a mental impairment under the ADA); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir.
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tation” have generated much litigation.
B. MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY
The EEOC defines major life activities by example, noting
that they include “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”21 In the appendix to its regulations, the EEOC further notes that major life activities
generally include “those basic activities that the average person
in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty.”22 Recognizing that the examples listed in its regulations
focus primarily on physical activities, the EEOC specified in its
Compliance Manual that “[m]ental and emotional processes
such as thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others”
constitute additional examples of major life activities.23 Continued confusion regarding the definition of major life activity
in the context of mental illness24 led the EEOC to further clarify its position in its 1997 publication, EEOC Enforcement
Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities.25 Here, the EEOC reiterates that mental processes, including “interacting with others,” constitute major life
activities under the ADA.26
Unfortunately, the EEOC’s guidance on the definition of
major life activity has not led to uniform interpretation of the
term. This is because courts, including the Supreme Court,
have questioned the deference due the EEOC’s regulations and
enforcement guidelines.27 The Court’s decision in Sutton v.
1997) (concluding that a plaintiff ’s dysthymia is a mental impairment within
the meaning of the ADA).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004).
22. Id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i).
23. EEOC DEFINITION OF DISABILITY, supra note 14, § 902.3(b).
24. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1147.
25. EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14.
26. Id. at 5.
27. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (noting that responsibility for implementing the ADA is not delegated to a single agency but
declining to address the issue of deference); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc.,
105 F.3d 12, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the EEOC Compliance Manual
is “hardly binding” on courts); Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87 (D.D.C.
2005) (noting that the EEOC Compliance Manual recognizes “interacting with
others” as a major life activity under the ADA but that “its persuasive value
remains undetermined”); see also John N. Ohlweiler, Disability and the Major
Life Activity of Work: An Un-“Work”-Able Definition, 60 BUS. LAW. 577, 592
n.76 (2005).
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United Air Lines, Inc. provides a vivid example.28 In Sutton, the
Court held that a physical or mental impairment corrected by
mitigating measures (e.g., medication, corrective lenses) does
not substantially limit a major life activity and thus does not
constitute a disability under the ADA.29 In so holding, the
Court flatly rejected the EEOC’s position on the issue of mitigating measures and disability—the EEOC regulations expressly directed courts to determine a person’s disability status
based on his or her functioning in an unmitigated state.30
The Supreme Court provided its own guidance on the definition of major life activity in Bragdon v. Abbott.31 The case involved a plaintiff with asymptomatic HIV infection who filed an
ADA claim after a dentist refused to treat her in his office.32
She asserted that HIV constituted a disability under the ADA
because it substantially limited her ability to engage in the major life activity of reproduction.33 In analyzing what constitutes
a major life activity, the majority concluded that the plain
meaning of the word “major” denotes “comparative importance”
or “significance.”34 In light of this, the Court held that reproduction constitutes a major life activity because “[r]eproduction
and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life
process itself.”35 The majority rejected the dissent’s opinion
that major life activities should only include activities that occur frequently and continuously.36
28. 527 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1999).
29. Id.
30. See id.; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (2004).
31. 524 U.S. at 638.
32. Id. at 628–30.
33. Id. at 637.
34. Id. at 638 (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939–40 (1st Cir.
1997)).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 659–60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged that decisions regarding reproduction are of central
importance to a person’s life but stressed that such importance is not the defining characteristic of the illustrative major life activities in the EEOC regulations and interpretive guidelines. Id. Instead, the “common thread” among
the EEOC’s illustrative examples is that “activities are repetitively performed
and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual.”
Id. at 660. Justice O’Connor offered a similar rationale, stressing that reproduction is not a major life activity because, although important to the lives of
many women, it “is not generally the same as the representative major life activities of all persons—‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working’—listed in
regulations relevant to the [ADA].” Id. at 664–65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
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The notion that a major life activity must have a daily or
repetitive component appeared in the Court’s later decision in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.37
In Toyota, the Supreme Court reconsidered whether a major life activity must occur on a regular or daily basis.38 The
Toyota Court endorsed the Bragdon Court’s interpretation of
“major” as denoting importance but added a regularity component to the definition in holding that major life activities are
those that “are of central importance to most people’s daily
lives.”39 After Toyota, major life activities clearly must have a
daily character.40 The Toyota court also emphasized that the
ADA must “be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.”41 It reasoned that interpreting
major life activity liberally would result in significantly more
disabled individuals than the forty-three million identified by
Congress as having physical or mental disabilities.42 This, in
fact, is a common theme in the case law arising under the
ADA—courts emphasize the need to construe the ADA strictly
so as “to cover only ‘true’ disabilities.”43
C. SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION
The EEOC regulations provide two alternative definitions
of “substantial limitation”: (1) “[u]nable to perform a major life
activity that the average person in the general population can
perform;” or (2) “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
(quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997) and 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)); see
also Ohlweiler, supra note 27, at 594–96 (discussing the varied definitions of
“major life activity” articulated in Bragdon’s majority and dissenting opinions).
37. 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
40. See Ohlweiler, supra note 27, at 606 (noting that after Toyota, it is
clear that “a ‘major’ life activity must be a ‘basic’ life activity: one that is essential to the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual”).
41. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
42. Id. at 197–98.
43. Hensel, supra note 4, at 1152; see also, e.g., Colwell v. Suffolk County
Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 1998) (highlighting the importance of
ensuring that only individuals with significant disabilities are protected under
the ADA); Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 152
(2d Cir. 1998) (noting that “[n]arrowing and diluting the definition of major
life activity” would undercut the ADA’s protection of only those individuals
with substantial disabilities).
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particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform that same major life activity.”44
The EEOC directs courts to consider three factors: (1) the “nature and severity of the impairment;” (2) its “duration or expected duration;” and (3) its “permanent or long term impact.”45
With respect to duration, the EEOC’s enforcement guidelines
specify that an impairment is “substantially limiting if it lasts
for more than several months and significantly restricts the
performance of one or more major life activities.”46 The guidelines describe a person with major depressive disorder of one
year’s duration that is characterized by symptoms of intense
sadness, social withdrawal (other than going to work), insomnia, and severe problems with concentration.47 This person has
a mental impairment (major depressive disorder) that affects
his ability to interact with others, sleep, and concentrate (three
major life activities).48 The impairment’s effects are sufficiently
severe and of long enough duration to qualify as substantially
limiting.49
With respect to the major life activity of interacting with
others, the EEOC guidelines specify that a person is substantially limited “if his/her relations with others [a]re characterized on a regular basis by severe problems, for example, consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to
communicate when necessary.”50 For example, a person diagnosed with schizophrenia who stays in his room for several
months and usually refuses to talk with family or close friends
is substantially limited in interacting with others, and therefore disabled within the meaning of the ADA.51
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court clarified that a
plaintiff need not establish a complete inability to perform a
major life activity in order to prove a substantial limitation.52
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2004).
45. § 1630.2(j)(2).
46. EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 8.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 10. The guidelines also point out that “[i]nteracting with others
. . . is not substantially limited just because an individual is irritable or has
some trouble getting along with a supervisor or coworker.” Id. at 5 n.15.
51. Id. at 10.
52. 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (“The Act addresses substantial limitations
on major life activities, not utter inabilities.”).
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Instead, one satisfies the definition “[w]hen significant limitations result from the impairment . . . even if the difficulties are
not insurmountable.”53 The plaintiff still must demonstrate a
“substantial” or “considerable” limitation.54 Impairments having only a minor effect on a major life activity will not qualify
as a disability under the ADA.55 In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Court further clarified that
the substantial impairment analysis must not be limited to the
workplace; courts are to consider the effect of the plaintiff ’s impairment both within and outside the work environment.56 The
Court added in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. that courts
must determine a plaintiff ’s disability status in light of all
mitigating measures, including medication.57
Many argue that courts’ interpretation of key terms under
the ADA has failed to provide the “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards” that Congress intended.58 Employers and
employees alike have spent much time and money fighting over
what constitutes a disability under the ADA. The problem
stems, in part, from the varying deference courts have afforded
the EEOC’s regulations and interpretive guidelines.59 As noted
above, the Supreme Court has questioned the EEOC’s authority to issue regulations interpreting the meaning of “disability”
under the ADA but has declined to address the issue directly.60
In Toyota, the Court assumed, without deciding, that the
EEOC regulations were reasonable but failed to address what
deference, if any, was due.61 Currently, the federal circuits dis53. Id.
54. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002).
55. Id. at 197.
56. Id. at 201.
57. 527 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1999).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000). See generally Feldblum, supra note 5,
at 139–60 (reviewing judicial interpretations of the ADA’s definition of disability).
59. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 n.2 (1st Cir.
1997) (noting that the EEOC Compliance Manual is “hardly binding”); Bell v.
Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that the EEOC Compliance Manual recognizes “interacting with others” as a major life activity
under the ADA, but that “its persuasive value remains undetermined”).
60. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479 (“[N]o agency has been delegated authority to
interpret the term ‘disability.’ . . . The EEOC has, nonetheless, issued regulations to provide additional guidance regarding the proper interpretation of this
term.”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (noting that responsibility
for implementing the ADA is not delegated to a single agency but declining to
address the issue of deference).
61. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 194.
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agree over several issues on which the EEOC has spoken, including whether interacting with others constitutes a “major
life activity” and, if so, how to determine whether a plaintiff is
“substantially limited” in this area.62
II. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
To date, three circuits have considered whether a substantial limitation in interacting with others constitutes a disability
under the ADA. Each resolved the issue differently. The courts
disagree on both of the main issues: (1) whether interacting
with others constitutes a major life activity; and (2) if so, what
constitutes a substantial limitation in this area.
A. INTERACTING WITH OTHERS AS A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY
1. The First Circuit
The First Circuit was the first to address the issue of
whether interacting with others constitutes a major life activity
under the ADA. In Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., a plaintiff
diagnosed with dysthymia, a chronic depressive disorder, alleged that he was disabled under the ADA because his mental
disorder substantially limited his ability to interact with others.63 The First Circuit began its analysis by noting that the
EEOC regulations promulgated under the ADA do not list the
ability to interact with others as an example of a “major life activity.”64 The court did acknowledge in a footnote that the
EEOC enforcement guidelines list interacting with others as a
major life activity, but the opinion emphasized that such guidelines are not binding on courts.65 It then declined to recognize
interacting with others as a major life activity, reasoning that
the “ability to get along with others” is a “remarkably elastic”
concept, the presence of which may depend on subjective judgment and/or the particular situation.66 The court refused to in62. See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric
Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 283 (2000) (noting that some circuit courts have refused to apply the EEOC’s recommended definitions of “major life activity” and
“substantially limited”).
63. See 105 F.3d at 13.
64. See id. at 15.
65. See id. at 15 n.2.
66. Id. at 15 (“Here, Soileau’s alleged inability to interact with others
came and went and was triggered by vicissitudes of life which are normally
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flict a legal duty on an employer “based on such an amorphous
concept.”67 It noted, however, that “a more narrowly defined
concept going to essential attributes of human communication
could, in a particular setting, be understood to be a major life
activity” under the ADA.68 As discussed below, the Second Circuit later endorsed such a standard in Jacques v. DiMarzio,
Inc.69
2. The Ninth Circuit
Two years following the First Circuit’s decision in Soileau,
the Ninth Circuit considered the same question in McAlindin v.
County of San Diego and reached the opposite conclusion.70 The
plaintiff in McAlindin claimed that his diagnosed anxiety disorder substantially limited his ability to interact with others,
thus constituting a disability under the ADA.71 The Ninth Circuit looked to the EEOC regulations and interpretive guidelines for guidance in defining what constitutes a major life activity under the ADA.72 It concluded that “[b]ecause interacting
with others is an essential, regular function, like walking and
breathing, it easily falls within the definition of ‘major life activity.’”73 The court expressly rejected the First Circuit’s admonition that “getting along with others” is too amorphous a concept to constitute a major life activity under the ADA.74 It
pointed out that nothing in the statutory text implicated clarity
as a criterion for defining a major life activity.75 The court further noted that the well-recognized major life activity of “caring
for oneself” is just as vague as “interacting with others.”76 Several district courts have followed McAlindin, emphasizing that
the “substantially limited” prong of the disability analysis can
adequately address concerns regarding the breadth of “interacting with others” as a major life activity.77
stressful for ordinary people—losing a girlfriend or being criticized by a supervisor.”).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 2004).
70. See 192 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999).
71. See id. at 1230.
72. See id. at 1233 & n.6.
73. Id. at 1234.
74. Id. at 1234–35.
75. See id. at 1234.
76. Id. at 1235.
77. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1167 nn.197–98 (citing several cases fol-
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3. The Second Circuit
In Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., the Second Circuit became
the most recent appellate court to address this issue.78 It concluded that “interacting with others” constitutes a major life activity under the ADA, although “getting along with others” does
not.79 The plaintiff suffered from bipolar II disorder and a longstanding history of psychiatric problems.80 After being terminated from her job following multiple confrontations with
coworkers, the plaintiff filed an ADA claim alleging a substantial limitation in interacting with others.81 The Second Circuit
began its analysis by distinguishing between the life activities
of “getting along with others” (considered in Soileau) and “interacting with others” (considered in McAlindin).82 It noted
that “‘interacting with others’ . . . more objectively describes a
life activity than does ‘getting along with others,’ which connotes proficiency or success” and necessitates a more subjective
analysis.83 In making this distinction, the Second Circuit
attempted to reconcile the disagreement between its sister circuits. It endorsed the First Circuit’s conclusion that “getting
along with others” is too subjective to be considered a major life
activity under the ADA84 while concurring with the Ninth Circuit’s position that “interacting with others” is “‘an essential,
regular function’ that ‘easily falls within’” the ADA’s definition
of major life activity.85 The Second Circuit then went on to reject the Ninth Circuit’s standard for determining when one is
“substantially limited” in interacting with others.86

lowing McAlindin).
78. 386 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 2004).
79. See id. at 202.
80. See id. at 195.
81. See id. at 197–98.
82. See id. at 202.
83. Id.
84. See id. (“We agree with the First Circuit’s observation that ‘get[ting]
along with others’ is an unworkably subjective definition of a ‘major life activity’ under the ADA—in much the same way that ‘perceiving’ (as distinct from
merely ‘seeing’ or ‘hearing’) would be an unworkably subjective ‘major life activity.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105
F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997)).
85. Id. (quoting McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234
(9th Cir. 1999)).
86. See id. at 202–03.
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4. Other Courts
Although other circuits have confronted the issue of
whether interacting with others constitutes a major life activity
under the ADA, they all avoided addressing it directly.87 Several have done this by skipping to the “substantially limited”
prong of the analysis.88 By finding that the plaintiff is not substantially limited in interacting with others, a court can hold
that he or she is not protected under the ADA without having
to decide if interacting with others constitutes a major life activity. The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue.
B. STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHING A SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION
IN INTERACTING WITH OTHERS
Once a court holds that interacting with others is a major
life activity, it must determine what constitutes a “substantial
limitation” in this activity. The Ninth and Second Circuits addressed this issue in McAlindin and Jacques, respectively.
They disagreed on the answer.
1. The Ninth Circuit
After concluding in McAlindin that interacting with others
constitutes a major life activity, the Ninth Circuit looked to the
EEOC’s interpretive guidelines to determine what constitutes a
substantial limitation in this area. It adopted the EEOC’s recommendation that a plaintiff attempting to establish a substantial limitation in interacting with others “must show that
his ‘relations with others [a]re characterized on a regular basis
by severe problems, for example, consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary.’”89 The court stressed that the limitation “must be severe”
and that mere cantankerousness or “trouble getting along with
coworkers” does not constitute a substantial limitation in this
area.90 The court focused on documented medical evidence pertaining to the plaintiff ’s symptoms when concluding that the
87. See id. at 202 n.8 for a summary of circuits declining to address
whether interacting with others constitutes a major life activity under the
ADA.
88. See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 274
(4th Cir. 2004); Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628–29 (8th Cir.
2003); Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 2001).
89. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235 (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC
ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, ¶ 9, at 10).
90. Id.
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evidence demonstrated a genuine issue of fact regarding
whether the plaintiff ’s anxiety disorder resulted in a substantial limitation in interacting with others.91
2. The Second Circuit
To date, the Second Circuit sets the highest bar for a plaintiff attempting to prove a substantial limitation in interacting
with others. In Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., the court did not
mince words when it condemned the Ninth Circuit’s test as
“unworkable, unbounded, and useless as guidance to employers, employees, judges, and juries.”92 It proclaimed the Ninth
Circuit’s demarcation between hostility and mere cantankerousness “illusory”93 and asserted that its test “frustrates the
maintenance of a civil workplace environment.”94 The court
opined that a standard requiring “consistently high levels of
hostility” would simply result in more protection under the
ADA for the most “troublesome and nasty . . . employee.”95
In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s (and the EEOC’s) approach,
the Second Circuit announced a new standard for determining
whether a person is substantially limited in interacting with
others. One meets this standard “when the mental or physical
impairment severely limits the fundamental ability to communicate with others.”96 The court made it clear that only those
with the most basic, severe limitations in communication would
qualify under this test, but it noted that a number of severe
psychiatric disorders may result in such impairment.97 The
court elaborated:
This standard is satisfied when the impairment severely limits the
plaintiff ’s ability to connect with others, i.e., to initiate contact with
other people and respond to them, or to go among other people—at
the most basic level of these activities. The standard is not satisfied
by a plaintiff whose basic ability to communicate with others is not
substantially limited but whose communication is inappropriate, ineffective, or unsuccessful. A plaintiff who otherwise can perform the
functions of a job with (or without) reasonable accommodation could

91. See id. at 1235–36 (noting that several evaluating physicians documented the plaintiff ’s pattern of withdrawal caused by his anxiety disorder).
92. 386 F.3d at 202.
93. In making its point, the Second Circuit pointed out the similarities in
the dictionary definitions of “hostile” and “cantankerous.” Id. at 203.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 203–04.
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satisfy this standard by demonstrating isolation resulting from any of
a number of severe conditions, including acute or profound cases of:
autism, agoraphobia, depression or other conditions that we need not
try to anticipate today.98

By requiring a significant limitation in the fundamental
ability to communicate, the Second Circuit appears to have set
a tougher standard for plaintiffs than either the Ninth Circuit99
or the EEOC.100
3. Other Courts
Several other circuits have considered whether a plaintiff
with a psychiatric disorder is substantially impaired in interacting with others, but none has outlined a specific standard for
deciding the issue.101 To date, the Supreme Court has declined
to address the issue.102 Consequently, both employers and employees face uncertainty when confronting this unresolved area
of the law.
III. COURTS’ UNEVEN TREATMENT OF
INTERACTING-WITH-OTHERS CLAIMS
Interacting-with-others claims have received decidedly uneven treatment by the courts. Although unpredictability characterizes both the major life activity and substantial limitation
prongs of the analysis, the variance in the latter is particularly
noteworthy.
A. INTERACTING WITH OTHERS AS A MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY
In enacting the ADA, Congress consciously chose to protect
individuals with both mental and physical impairments.103 The
Act, however, has fallen short in its attempt to protect persons

98. Id.
99. See McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir.
1999).
100. See EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, ¶ 9, at 10.
101. See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 274
(4th Cir. 2004); Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 628–29 (8th Cir.
2003).
102. See, e.g., McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 530 U.S. 1243 (2000), denying cert. to 192 F.3d 1226.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (“The term ‘disability’ means . . . a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more . . . major
life activities.” (emphasis added)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2004) (listing “emotional or mental illness” as an impairment under the ADA).
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with mental impairments.104 For example, courts more often
hold that interacting with others is a major life activity when a
person with a physical impairment (e.g., diabetes, AIDS),
rather than a mental impairment, brings the claim.105 This
seems somewhat counterintuitive. Diabetes, for example, is not
likely to impair one’s interaction with others to the extent that
a mental illness such as bipolar I disorder would. A person
must demonstrate “marked” impairment in social or occupational functioning before even receiving a diagnosis of bipolar I
disorder.107 This tendency may reflect the discomfort that
many, including judges, have with mental illness.108 As Professor Nancy Hensel has noted, “Judges, and indeed employers,
are likely concerned that if they recognize interacting with others in the context of mental disability, they will be validating
frivolous claims brought by ‘otherwise normal’ employees who
are simply ‘difficult’ and manipulating the ADA to secure preferable and unwarranted concessions.”109 This is a valid concern:
courts must craft a standard narrow enough to block frivolous
claims yet broad enough to allow legitimate claims to proceed.
Although courts continue to disagree about whether interacting with others should constitute a major life activity,110 the
recent trend is toward recognizing it as such.111 Doing so corresponds with both the EEOC’s and the Supreme Court’s guidance on the ADA’s definition of “major life activity.” The EEOC
expressly lists interacting with others as a major life activity in
its interpretive guidelines.112 In Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that a ma104. See Douglas A. Blair, Employees Suffering from Bipolar Disorder or
Clinical Depression: Fighting an Uphill Battle for Protection Under Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1347, 1358 (1999);
Hensel, supra note 4, at 1139–42.
105. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1168.
107. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 17, at 355–58.
108. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1168–70.
109. Id. at 1169–70.
110. Compare Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir.
1997) (declining to recognize interacting with others as a major life activity
under the ADA), with Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir.
2004), and McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir.
1999) (both recognizing interacting with others as a major life activity under
the ADA).
111. See, e.g., DiMarzio, 386 F.3d at 202; McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1234.
112. See EEOC DEFINITION OF DISABILITY, supra note 14, § 902.3(b);
EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, ¶ 3, at 5.
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jor life activity is one that is “of central importance to daily
life.”113 Undoubtedly, interacting with others constitutes a significant and regular aspect of most people’s daily lives.114 Similar to walking, breathing, and caring for oneself (other commonly recognized major life activities under the ADA), most
people must interact with others multiple times throughout the
day. It is thus “essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual.”115 Consequently, courts should
follow the Ninth and Second Circuits’ lead in recognizing interacting with others as a major life activity under the ADA.
Uniform recognition of interacting with others as a major
life activity would lower one roadblock for persons with mental
illness attempting to establish a disability in this area. However, the “substantial limitation” prong creates an even larger
hurdle for plaintiffs.116
B. ESTABLISHING A SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION IN INTERACTING
WITH OTHERS
Litigants face particular difficulty when trying to predict a
court’s analysis of what constitutes a substantial limitation in
interacting with others. Courts vary in their treatment of several issues, including the degree of limitation required across
different spheres of life (e.g., work versus home), the temporal
requirements of the limitation, and the weight accorded to expert medical testimony regarding the limitation.
1. Substantial Limitation Versus Complete Inability
Commentators posit that courts employ “excessively exacting standards” in determining whether a plaintiff is substan113. 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
114. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1189–90, for an excellent discussion of
why interacting with others should be uniformly recognized as a major life activity under the ADA. Hensel notes that “[i]nteracting with others, by any
definition, is a required precursor to an individual’s ability to work, to love, to
reproduce and to function on a day-to-day basis in modern society.” Id. at
1189.
115. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 660 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
116. See Kathleen D. Zylan, Comment, Legislation That Drives Us Crazy:
An Overview of “Mental Disability” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
31 CUMB. L. REV. 79, 94 (2000) (“[A]lthough the courts are somewhat split on
how broadly they should interpret ‘major life activity,’ this term does not seem
to be the major stumbling block for employees in proving disability. . . . [T]he
test for ‘substantial limitation’ appears to play a major ‘gatekeeping’ role in
limiting claims.”).

BENRUD-LARSON_3FMT

1808

06/12/2006 08:30:13 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1791

tially limited in interacting with others.117 Despite the Supreme Court’s instruction in Bragdon that “substantially limited” does not require a “complete inability” to perform a major
life activity,118 courts often have required virtual incapacity in
interpersonal relations in order for a plaintiff to prevail in an
interacting-with-others claim.119 Evidence of any ability to interact with others in either one’s private or work life likely will
defeat a plaintiff ’s disability claim at the summary judgment
stage.120 For example, in Heisler v. Metropolitan Council, the
plaintiff suffered from a twenty-year history of severe depression marked by multiple hospitalizations and ongoing outpatient treatment, including electroconvulsive therapy.121 Despite
the plaintiff ’s testimony that her depression caused great sadness, isolation, and a failure to talk to anyone, the Eighth Circuit concluded that she was not substantially impaired in interacting with others.122 The court apparently based its
conclusion largely on the fact that the plaintiff ’s depression did
not prohibit her from performing her job, which involved supervising other employees.123
Similarly, in Steele v. Thiokol Corp., the Tenth Circuit held
that a plaintiff suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder
(OCD) was not substantially limited in interacting with others
despite evidence of repeated problems with multiple coworkers
and supervisors that ultimately resulted in a “nervous breakdown” and a three-and-a-half week leave of absence.124 The
court emphasized that, unlike the plaintiff in McAlindin, Mr.
Steele failed to provide evidence that his OCD caused substantial impairment in getting along with people in general.125 Instead, he only provided evidence of difficulties getting along
117. Hensel, supra note 4, at 1178 (“[C]ourts have interpreted the ‘substantially limited’ requirement to be so exacting in connection with interacting
with others that few plaintiffs have been able to survive summary judgment.”); see also DeLoach, supra note 6, at 1338 (“Essentially, the . . . court
equated substantial limitation with total inability to interact with others.”).
118. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
119. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1181; see also Heisler v. Metro. Council,
339 F.3d 622, 625, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2003); Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d
1248, 1250–52, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (both holding that the plaintiff did not
produce sufficient evidence to prevail on an interacting with others claim).
120. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194.
121. See 339 F.3d at 625.
122. See id. at 628–29.
123. See id. at 629.
124. 241 F.3d at 1250–52.
125. See id. at 1255.
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with people at work, which was not enough to survive summary
judgment.126
While some courts require plaintiffs to demonstrate a
nearly complete inability to interact with others across all
spheres of life, others allow a case to proceed on much weaker
evidence of a substantial limitation. In Bennett v. Unisys Corp.,
a plaintiff with major depressive disorder survived summary
judgment based on her and her coworkers’ testimony that she
was “belligerent,” had “difficulty controlling her emotions,” and
possessed deficient interpersonal skills at work.127 The court
purportedly applied the McAlindin/EEOC standard and noted
that one does not have to show a complete inability to interact
with others or daily problems to establish a substantial limitation in interacting with others.128 In Lemire v. Silva, the plaintiff had a longstanding history of panic disorder with agoraphobia.129 The plaintiff ’s treating psychiatrist testified that
although her ability to relate to her family continued to have a
good prognosis, she was impaired in her ability to interact with
others in crowded places.130 Based on this evidence, the court,
applying the McAlindin standard, concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff ’s inability to interact with others in crowded places constituted a substantial limitation in interacting with others.131 Clearly, courts
ostensibly applying the same standard come up with very different results.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams suggests that courts are correct to require evidence of impairment in interacting with others across multiple spheres of life.132 The Court’s decision in
Bragdon v. Abbott, however, established that a disability under
the ADA does not require proof of a complete inability to perform a major life activity.134 An impairment may substantially
126. See id.; see also Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117,
1131 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Steele in holding that the plaintiff ’s severe interpersonal problems with multiple coworkers did not establish a general inability to get along with others).
127. No. 2:99 CV0446, 2000 WL 33126583, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2000).
128. See id. at *5.
129. See 104 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83 (D. Mass. 2000).
130. See id. at 88.
131. See id.
132. See 534 U.S. 184, 200–01 (2002).
134. See 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).
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limit a major life activity even if the resulting difficulties are
not “insurmountable” in all areas of a person’s life.135 The fact
that an individual attempts to participate in a major life activity despite an impairment should not automatically signal that
he or she is not substantially limited in that activity.136
2. Substantial Limitation and Chronic Intermittent Disorders
Commentators also criticize courts’ analyses of duration of
psychiatric disabilities when evaluating whether a plaintiff is
substantially limited in interacting with others.137 Courts often
minimize the disabling impact of chronic conditions by rejecting
claims of psychiatric disability that are not supported by medical evidence of recurrent and ongoing problems.138 Thus, a person with a severe but intermittent chronic disorder likely faces
an uphill battle in establishing a disability based on substantial impairment in interacting with others.
Courts must not automatically discount psychiatric disorders with an episodic course. One with a severe mental illness
may experience a disease course marked by periods of relative
adjustment interspersed with periods of substantially impaired
functioning. For example, the DSM-IV describes bipolar I disorder as a “recurrent disorder” in which the majority of those
affected “return to a fully functional level between [manic] episodes.”139 The lack of constant impaired functioning should not,
in itself, defeat a disability claim. Courts should not downplay
the severity of a psychiatric disorder just because the plaintiff
does not experience florid symptoms on a daily basis. Instead, a
court must distinguish between acute manifestations of a serious, underlying psychiatric disorder (e.g., bipolar I disorder)
versus a temporary, nonchronic condition (e.g., adjustment dis-

135. See id.
136. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194 (quoting Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002)). Hensel elaborates:
Just as an individual in a wheelchair “may be mobile and capable of
functioning in society but still be disabled because of a substantial
limitation on their ability to walk or run,” an individual capable of interacting with others some of the time who nevertheless experiences
significant difficulty in doing so likewise is substantially limited in
the ability to interact with others.
Id. (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999)).
137. See, e.g., id. at 1187.
138. See id. at 1187–88.
139. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 17, at 353.
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order, bereavement).140 The EEOC recognized this when it
noted in its enforcement guidelines that “[c]hronic, episodic
conditions may constitute substantially limiting impairments if
they are substantially limiting when active or have a high likelihood of recurrence in substantially limiting forms.”141
The Third Circuit heeded the EEOC’s guidance regarding
chronic conditions in Taylor v. Phoenixville School District.142
The fact that the plaintiff did not experience problems on a
daily basis due to bipolar disorder did not foreclose the possibility that she was substantially limited in the major life activity
of thinking.143 The court noted that “[c]hronic, episodic conditions can easily limit how well a person performs an activity as
compared to the rest of the population.”144 The substantial limitation inquiry must focus on the nature (e.g., typical course)
and severity of the impairment rather than the mere number of
days one experiences limitations.145 A plaintiff suffering from a
“severe and potentially long-term” condition should survive
summary judgment and proceed to a presentation of his or her
case on the merits.146
Of course, simply counting the number of days a plaintiff
claims substantial impairment is much easier than analyzing
whether the severity, duration, and course of a mental impairment cause a substantial limitation in interacting with others.

140. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1195 (“[I]t is simply inequitable to view
each episode of disability in isolation, equating flare-ups of serious underlying
and ongoing impairments with mere temporary and ‘intermittent’ conditions . . . .”); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 17, at 626, 684 (describing adjustment disorder and bereavement).
141. EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 9.
142. 184 F.3d 296, 309 (3d Cir. 1999).
143. See id.
144. Id. The court also noted:
When we consider the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration, and its expected long-term impact, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2),
we find evidence that [the plaintiff] has had to contend with a serious,
very much ongoing condition. . . . That she may not have experienced
problems every day does not defeat her claim. . . . [R]epeated flare-ups
of poor health can have a cumulative weight that wears down a person’ resolve and continually breaks apart longer-term projects.
Id.
145. See Hensel, supra note 4, at 1195.
146. Id. at 1196; see also Zylan, supra note 116, at 95 (asserting that consideration of duration is unnecessary in determining whether a mental impairment substantially limits a major life activity because it might bar valid
claims of those who suffer “an episodic or seemingly transient emotional disorder”).
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The more comprehensive analysis of the substantial limitation
requires knowledge of psychiatric disorders, which necessitates
reliance on psychiatric experts. As such, documented medical
evidence plays a critical role in substantiating a claim of substantial impairment in interacting with others.
3. Reliance on Documented Medical Evidence
Not surprisingly, courts vary in the extent to which they
rely on (or perhaps believe) documented medical evidence and
expert testimony regarding the effect of a plaintiff ’s mental disorder on his or her ability to interact with others. The
McAlindin court relied heavily on documented clinical findings
from multiple physicians indicating that the plaintiff ’s mental
illness resulted in a pattern of withdrawal from public places
and family members.147 The court concluded that the documented medical evidence “suggest[ed] that McAlindin suffer[ed] from a total inability to communicate at times, in addition to a more subtle impairment in engaging in meaningful
discussion” and that his “alleged ‘fear reaction’ and ‘communicative paralysis’ [we]re sufficiently severe to raise a genuine issue of material fact about his ability to interact with others.”148
In contrast, the court did not place considerable weight on
documented medical evidence of the plaintiff ’s impairment in
Zale v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.149 The court determined that the
plaintiff ’s “chronic and moderately severe”150 post traumatic
stress disorder—characterized by distressing dreams, feelings
of detachment from others, irritability, avoidance, hyperalertness, poor anger control, and psychological distress151—did not
cause a substantial impairment in interacting with others.152 It
concluded that the plaintiff ’s problems with coworkers reflected
“a situational response, exacerbated by work harassment but
lacking facts showing a manifestation of any regular or consistent nature.”153 The court noted that there was little in the re-

147. See McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir.
1999).
148. Id. at 1235–36.
149. See No. 3:97CV00125(JBA), 2000 WL 306943, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 7,
2000).
150. Id. at *5.
151. See id. at *1, *5.
152. See id. at *1, *6 (finding that Zale’s evidence “is insufficient . . . to
meet the standard set out in McAlindin”).
153. Id. at *6.
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cord to distinguish the plaintiff from the average “‘cantankerous employee’ referenced in McAlindin.”154
As illustrated by the above discussion, the evidence required to establish a disability by demonstrating a substantial
impairment in interacting with others depends primarily on
the court hearing the case.155 In light of this, several commentators emphasize the need for more detailed guidance on the issue.156 Some posit that the Ninth and Second Circuits provided
the necessary guidance in McAlindin and DiMarzio, respectively.157 Others are not so sure.158
C. THE MCALINDIN AND DIMARZIO SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION
STANDARDS
Both the Ninth and Second Circuits attempted to clarify
the definition of “substantially limited” in the context of an “interacting with others claim,” with questionable success. The
154. Id.
155. Cf. Feldblum, supra note 5, at 150 (“[T]he varied results in cases under the ADA as to whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity often seem to depend more on the court’s belief in the merits of the
plaintiff ’s underlying claim than on the specific effects of the plaintiff ’s impairment on his or her life.”).
156. See, e.g., DeLoach, supra note 6, at 1341–42 (noting that the lower
courts need more detailed guidance regarding the meaning of “substantially
limits” and calling for the EEOC to promulgate regulations providing “a more
comprehensive statement of what a plaintiff must show to establish a substantial limitation in her ability to interact with others”); see also Rothstein et al.,
supra note 4, at 296–97 (noting that the underlying purpose of the ADA has
been “undermined by the failure to create a reasonably clear definition of the
crucial term ‘individual with a disability’”).
157. See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194 (“The McAlindin standard,
whereby those demonstrating severe problems on a regular basis, such as
‘consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal or failure to communicate when necessary,’ strikes a good balance between frivolous and significant
interacting with others claims.” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Lyda Phillips,
Accommodating the Problem Employee: No Easy Answers, Experts and Courts
Agree, 73 U.S. L. WK. 2275, 2276 (2004) (“[T]he Second Circuit’s standard for
determining whether a mental disability is substantially limiting offers ‘far
more practical guidance.’” (quoting Sharon Rennert, Senior Attorney Advisor,
ADA Division of EEOC)).
158. See, e.g., DeLoach, supra note 6, at 1342 (“While [the McAlindin]
standard appears to strike a better balance than courts that require almost
complete inability to interact with others, its language . . . may also be too
vague, thus allowing lower courts to continue setting too high a burden for the
substantial limitation requirement.”); see also Stephanie Francis Ward, A
Split on Personality, A.B.A. J. E-REP., Oct. 15, 2004, available at 3 No. 41
ABAJEREP 4 (Westlaw) (noting that the Second Circuit’s DiMarzio opinion
did little to clarify the definition of disability under the ADA).
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Ninth Circuit’s standard announced in McAlindin—interersonal interactions characterized by recurrent and severe
problems, such as “consistently high levels of hostility, social
withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary”159—
appears to provide concrete guidance. However, courts have
varied widely in their application of the standard.160 Many have
made the standard essentially insurmountable by requiring
“comprehensive evidence of virtual incapacity prior to a finding
of substantial limitation.”161
Courts’ application of the Second Circuit’s standard announced in DiMarzio (one is substantially limited in interacting
with others when a “mental or physical impairment severely
limits the fundamental ability to communicate with others”162)
remains untested. However, given that the DiMarzio standard
sets the bar higher for plaintiffs than the McAlindin standard,
courts already requiring a nearly complete inability to interact
with others likely will interpret the DiMarzio standard as requiring the same. After all, it does not require a stretch of the
imagination to argue that a limitation in the “fundamental
ability” to communicate essentially equals a virtual incapacity
to interact with others. On the other hand, one also could argue
that a person is limited in the fundamental ability to communicate with others if he or she has recurrent and severe problems
interacting with others, in other words, the McAlindin standard.164
Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s standard for defining a

159. McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 10).
160. Compare Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001)
(noting that if it applied the McAlindin standard the plaintiff would not be
substantially limited in interacting with others because he did not present
evidence of impairment outside of work), with Lemire v. Silva, 104 F. Supp. 2d
80, 88 (D. Mass. 2000) (applying the McAlindin standard and holding that the
plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she
was substantially limited in interacting with others due to difficulty interacting with others in crowded places).
161. Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194; see, e.g., Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339
F.3d 622, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff did not meet the
McAlindin standard because, despite significant depressive symptoms affecting her ability to interact with others, she continued to perform her job, which
involved supervising other employees).
162. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added).
164. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235.
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substantial limitation in interacting with others does little to
clarify the definition of the term. Employers and employees still
face a nonuniform and unpredictable standard. Undoubtedly,
courts will continue to struggle with, and disagree on, just how
severe a plaintiff ’s limitation in interacting with others must
be before it qualifies as “substantial.” Congress could address
this confusion and unpredictability by unambiguously directing
the EEOC to promulgate, through notice and comment rulemaking,165 concrete guidelines for determining the existence of
a substantial limitation in interacting with others. The EEOC
should ground the criteria in established psychiatric diagnoses
and expert testimony regarding the effect of a plaintiff ’s psychiatric disorder on his or her ability to interact with others.
Given the complexity of psychiatric diagnoses and the variability of their effects on functioning, it makes sense to leave the
determination of whether a person’s mental impairment substantially limits his or her ability to interact with others to the
experts—i.e., the mental health professionals responsible for
the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The uncertainty surrounding the definition of disability
under the ADA leaves all parties guessing and frustrates the
ADA’s goal of providing “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.”166 Further, the “virtual incapacity” standard applied by many courts in interacting-with-others claims does not
effectuate the intended purpose behind the ADA and often prevents deserving plaintiffs from presenting their case on the
merits.167 The challenge lies in fashioning a standard that

165. Notice and comment rulemaking is one method through which executive agencies promulgate regulations that have the force of law. See
Christensen v. Harris Co., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000).
167. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 5, at 150–51 (citing several cases meritorious on their face but ultimately dismissed because the disability was not
found to “substantially limit” the plaintiff and noting that courts “are perceiving a spirit of the ADA that was never envisioned by any of us who worked to
enact the law”); see also Hensel, supra note 4, at 1194 (“[D]eserving plaintiffs
should be permitted to present their claims before a jury without the need to
first present evidence of near-total incapacitation.”); Rothstein et al., supra
note 4, at 249 (“[T]he courts have been so restrictive in interpreting the statutory definition of an individual with a disability that the limited coverage approach has been extended beyond that intended by Congress.”).
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strikes an appropriate balance between the concerns of employers and employees while providing clear guidance to the courts.
This Note recommends that Congress authorize the EEOC
to establish, after notice and comment rulemaking, criteria for
determining when a mental impairment results in a substantial limitation in interacting with others. At a minimum, the
criteria should require documented medical evidence of a
preexisting mental impairment in the form of a DSM-IV diagnosis made by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist.168 A substantial limitation in interacting with others (and hence disability) would be presumed for certain DSM-IV diagnoses, such
as those for which “marked impairment” in interpersonal functioning is a required characteristic of the disorder. For other
psychiatric diagnoses, plaintiffs must present documented
medical evidence regarding the impact of the diagnosed mental
impairment on his or her ability to interact with others.169
A. PRESUMPTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION IN
INTERACTING WITH OTHERS BASED ON DSM-IV DIAGNOSES
To receive a psychiatric diagnosis, a person typically must
display some degree of impairment in occupational or social
functioning.170 For example, a diagnosis of severe major depressive disorder requires that symptoms “markedly interfere with
occupational functioning or with usual social activities or relationships with others.”171 The criteria for a manic episode require that symptoms “cause marked impairment in occupational functioning or in usual social activities or relationships

168. Both psychiatrists and clinical psychologists receive specialized training in the diagnosis of mental disorders.
169. See Zylan, supra note 116, at 114 (“Forcing employees to provide
documented evidence or expert opinion regarding the nexus between the conduct and the disorder should be required.”). Rothstein and his colleagues proposed a similar scheme calling for Congress to authorize the EEOC, after notice and comment rulemaking, to publish medical criteria for determining
when the most common physical and mental impairments are severe enough
to constitute a disability under the ADA. Rothstein et al., supra note 4, at 244,
270–72. Disability (and thus ADA coverage) would be presumed for those
meeting the established criteria; no disability would be presumed for those not
meeting the criteria. Id. A party could rebut the presumption by demonstrating, via clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff ’s impairment either
did or did not substantially limit a major life activity. Id.
170. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 17 (describing features of a wide range of mental disorders).
171. Id. at 377–78.
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with others.”172 A diagnosis of OCD requires that symptoms
“cause marked distress, are time consuming . . . or significantly
interfere with the person’s normal routine, occupational (or
academic) functioning, or usual social activities or relationships.”173
As illustrated above, many psychiatric diagnoses inherently contain evidence directly relevant to one’s ability to interact with others. A documented DSM-IV diagnosis characterized
by “marked” or “significant” impairment in social functioning
(e.g., severe major depressive disorder),174 should establish a
presumption of substantial impairment in interacting with others and, hence, disability under the ADA. In contrast, a plaintiff diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder that does not necessarily involve “marked” or “significant” impairment in
interpersonal functioning (e.g., mild major depressive disorder175) would have to provide documented medical evidence regarding the effect of the disorder on his or her ability to interact with others.
B. DOCUMENTED MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF A PSYCHIATRIC
DISORDER’S EFFECT ON FUNCTIONING
If significant impairment in interpersonal functioning is
not an essential criterion of a plaintiff ’s psychiatric diagnosis,
she or he must establish a substantial limitation in interacting
with others through documented medical evidence of the disorder’s effect on such functioning. The EEOC’s existing enforcement guidelines do not require expert testimony regarding a
substantial limitation.176 However, doing so would help legitimize these claims in the eyes of both courts and laypersons. It
certainly should help eliminate some of the error involved in allowing judges untrained in the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders to determine the existence and effect of a mental illness.177
172. Id. at 332.
173. Id. at 423.
174. Id. at 377–78.
175. Id. at 377 (describing a patient having “only minor impairment in occupational functions or in unusual social activities or relationships with others”).
176. See EEOC ON PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 6.
177. Of course, trained mental health professionals can, and do, disagree
regarding the correct psychiatric diagnosis. See Zylan, supra note 116, at 121–
22 (noting that psychiatric expert testimony can complicate litigation by creating a “battle of the experts”). However, such experts are arguably better at determining the existence and effect of a psychiatric disorder than is the judici-
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A person justifiably limited by a mental impairment likely
will have preexisting, documented medical evidence to that effect in the form of a psychiatric or psychological consultation
and ongoing treatment notes. Therefore, requiring such evidence should not provide an unreasonable hurdle for those with
legitimate claims. Further, it should help eliminate frivolous
claims conceived in a post hoc fashion following an adverse employment decision.178 On the other hand, reliance on expert testimony necessarily opens the door to “expert shopping” and potentially leaves the judge with the difficult task of refereeing a
“battle of the experts.”179 The Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA)180 provides one model for dealing with this problem.
Under the FMLA, an employee may take up to twelve
weeks leave for a “serious health condition.”181 Before authorizing leave, the employer may require the employee to provide
medical certification documenting the existence of the health
condition.182 If the employer questions the adequacy of the
medical certification provided by the employee, it may require a
second opinion from a health care professional of its choosing.183 The employer pays for the second evaluation, which may
not be performed by a health care provider used on a regular
basis by the employer.184 If the two experts disagree, the employer may require a third medical opinion.185 Both the employer and employee must approve the third evaluator,186
whose conclusions are dispositive.187
The EEOC could employ similar requirements for psychiatric disorders that do not meet the presumption of disability.
If mental health professionals testifying for the employee and
the employer disagree as to whether the employee’s mental imary.
178. See Blair, supra note 104, at 1397–98 (noting that requiring a documented psychiatric diagnosis would allow courts to dismiss claims where a
plaintiff “asserts an undiagnosed ailment while employed and then attempts
medical validation after termination”).
179. See Zylan, supra note 116, at 122.
180. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000)).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(1)(D).
182. See id. § 2613(a).
183. See id. § 2613(c)(1).
184. See id. § 2613(c)(2).
185. See id. § 2613(d)(1).
186. See id.
187. See id. § 2613(d)(2).
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pairment causes a substantial limitation in interacting with
others, the court could require a third opinion. The parties together would designate the “tiebreaker” expert whose opinion
would be final and binding.
C. ADOPTING THE REGULATIONS
Drafting regulations establishing criteria for a substantial
impairment in interacting with others is not a simple task. It
is, however, an achievable one. Mental health professionals already diagnose psychiatric disorders based on established
DSM-IV criteria.188 Psychiatric diagnoses typically require
some degree of impairment in occupational or social functioning. Most also include an indication of the severity and course
of the disorder. Consequently, psychiatrists and clinical psychologists are well equipped to help specify diagnostic criteria
suitable for establishing a presumption of substantial limitation in interacting with others. Because agencies have access to
such experts, EEOC rulemaking provides the best approach for
establishing such standards.189 The inconsistency in courts’
deference to existing EEOC regulations and guidelines suggests that Congress may need to amend the ADA to ensure
compliance with the proposed regulations. A clear congressional statement granting the EEOC authority to implement
regulations regarding what constitutes a substantial limitation
in interacting with others likely would result in deference from
the courts.190
The current state of the law generates considerable uncertainty regarding what constitutes a disability under the ADA.
This unpredictability permeates the Act—it is not limited to
188. See Rothstein et al., supra note 4, at 271 (“Medical practice guidelines
and standard diagnostic and treatment protocols routinely designate the
medical criteria for determining when a condition is mild, moderate, or severe.
These determinations are crucial in the clinical setting to indicate the appropriate course of treatment.”).
189. See id. (proposing that the EEOC consult with professional medical
associations and organizations when promulgating rules establishing medical
standards).
190. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (holding
that the mandatory deference of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is reserved for agency interpretations
adopted pursuant to a congressional delegation of rulemaking authority); see
also DeLoach, supra note 6, at 1342–43 (recommending that the EEOC promulgate regulations regarding what constitutes a substantial limitation in interacting with others because courts afford greater deference to agency regulations promulgated through formal rulemaking procedures).
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persons with mental impairments attempting to establish a
substantial limitation in interacting with others.191 The confusion in the realm of interacting with others, however, is particularly salient. This likely stems from a number of factors, including the invisibility of mental impairments, widespread
misconceptions and stereotypes regarding their impact on functioning,192 and the lack of “objective” evidence demonstrating a
causal link between a mental impairment and functional limitations.193 As such, there is a heightened need for detailed regulatory guidance establishing what constitutes a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of interacting with others.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the ADA with the goal of providing clear
and consistent standards for eliminating discrimination against
persons with disabilities. This goal has not been realized. Persons with mental impairments seeking to establish a disability
based on a substantial limitation in interacting with others face
a particularly difficult battle. The unpredictability surrounding
this issue disadvantages employers and employees alike. EEOC
regulations establishing diagnostic criteria necessary to demonstrate a substantial limitation in interacting with others
would provide needed clarity to this contentious and confusing
area of the law.

191. See generally Rothstein et al., supra note 4. Rothstein and colleagues
call for a broad regulatory scheme in which Congress authorizes the EEOC to
publish medical criteria for determining when common physical and mental
impairments are severe enough to constitute a disability under the ADA. See
id. at 244. For example, the authors propose that persons with bipolar I disorder should qualify as disabled if they (1) are receiving ongoing treatment for a
confirmed diagnosis of bipolar I disorder; or (2) have a history of hospitalization for bipolar I disorder. See id. at 285. Persons with epilepsy should qualify
as disabled if they (1) have had “one generalized tonic-clonic seizure”; or (2)
have “been on [antiseizure medication] for at least one year.” Id. at 290.
192. For example, the notion that a person suffering from major depressive
disorder should just “snap out of it” implies that the person, not the mental
impairment, is causing any limitations in functioning.
193. Unlike with hearing and vision, there are no “objective” tests that indicate the degree to which a person’s mental impairment affects his or her
ability to interact with others.

